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NOTES
Get Off My Porch: United States v. Carloss and the
Escalating Dangers of “Knock and Talks”
“[E]very man’s house is his castle.”1 This maxim is one of the oldest and
most well-established principles in Anglo-American jurisprudence. In the
United States, the maxim is embedded in the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures, despite the continuing
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections in public places.2 Citizens
subject themselves to an ever-growing possibility of being searched when
on the streets and sidewalks,3 traveling through airports,4 attending school,5
or traveling in a car.6
Nevertheless, the home remains the last bastion of personal privacy.7 But
every time we open our home to guests or order a package from Amazon,
1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
2. Both dissenting Justices and scholars have noted the continuing erosion of
protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 567 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the “continuing evisceration
of Fourth Amendment protections”); Wayne R. LaFave, Supreme Court Report: Nine Key
Decisions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740, 1744 (1983); Silas J.
Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 261
(1984); John A. Hamilton, Comment, The United States Supreme Court's Erosion of Fourth
Amendment Rights: The Trend Continues, 30 S.D. L. REV. 574, 574 (1985).
3. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (establishing reasonable suspicion as
the standard for warrantless “stop and frisk” searches).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697 (1983) (upholding warrantless
detention of luggage based only on reasonable suspicion that it contained narcotics).
5. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995) (permitting
suspicionless drug testing of public school students who participated in school’s athletic
program); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985) (applying reasonable
suspicion standard to warrantless search of a student by school authorities).
6. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049–50 (1983) (establishing
reasonable suspicion standard for warrantless search of entire passenger compartment of an
automobile).
7. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the Fourth
Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”) (citation omitted); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (1980) (noting that it has long been “a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law
that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 (“[T]he sanctity of
private dwellings [is] ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment
protection.”).
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we implicitly invite strangers—salesmen, girl scouts, and even police
officers—to park in our driveways, walk on our sidewalks, come onto our
porches, and knock on our doors, exercising an understanding that a
driveway and front door present an implicit invitation to those very visitors
who wish to approach.8 Questions remain, however, as to how broadly
courts should construe this implied license, and how a homeowner can
revoke an implied invitation. Put another way, what measures are sufficient
to inform the girl scout or police officer that she or he is not welcome on
the property?
In United States v. Carloss, the Tenth Circuit construed the implied
license too broadly, holding that three “No Trespassing” signs posted
around the yard adjoining a house and one on the home’s front door did not
adequately inform the police officers that they were no longer invited onto
the property to approach the home.9 Part I of this Note describes the history
of “knock and talks” and their place within Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II discusses Carloss’s facts, holding, concurrence, and
dissent. Part III demonstrates the dangers and unfavorable results that stem
from the Tenth Circuit’s formulation and application of its Rule.10 Finally,
Part IV briefly concludes.
I. “Knock and Talks” and the Fourth Amendment
Fourth Amendment doctrine has evolved throughout the history of the
Supreme Court. For example, a “search” under the Fourth Amendment was
originally tethered to common-law trespass and required an actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area.11 In Katz v. United States, decided in
1967, the Supreme Court seemingly abandoned its trespass-based analytical
framework in favor of a test centered on a person’s reasonable expectation

8. Police use the implied license to talk with a home’s resident as an investigative tool,
which is referred to as a “knock and talk.” See United States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d
1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006).
9. 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 231 (2016). Three signs were
in the yard next to the driveway leading up to the defendant’s house, and one was placed on
the front door. Id.
10. For the purposes of this Note, the rule that the Tenth Circuit applied to determine
whether the implied license had been revoked will be referred to as “the Revocation Rule,”
or simply “the Rule.”
11. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (“[W]ell into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.”); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that a non-trespassory wiretapping was not a search).
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of privacy.12 But in 2012, the Court resurrected the trespass test in United
States v. Jones, asserting that the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy
test “has been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory
test.”13 Because two distinct tests now govern whether a Fourth
Amendment violation has occurred, and courts may apply either or both,
the trespass test’s resurrection has led to confusion and uncertainty. The
resulting confusion is most evident when determining the government’s
ability to conduct knock and talks and a citizen’s ability—or inability—to
prevent them.
The Fourth Amendment expressly extends its protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures to “persons, houses, papers, and
effects.”14 Supreme Court jurisprudence ensures that Fourth Amendment
protections are strongest when the “house” is involved, because “when it
comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals.”15 These
protections extend to the “curtilage,” which is the “land immediately
surrounding and associated with the home,” because the curtilage is
“considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.”16
Applying the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test, the Supreme Court has
explained that “[t]he protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a
protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to
the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations
are most heightened.”17 Applying the trespass-based analytical framework,
the Supreme Court has determined that a search “undoubtedly occur[s]”
when the government, without a warrant, obtains information “by
physically intruding” within the curtilage of a house.18 That is, a search

12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (overruling Olmstead, 277 U.S.
438). The “reasonable expectation of privacy,” or Katz, test was actually formulated by
Justice Harlan in his concurrence. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan’s
formulation was later adopted as the benchmark test for privacy expectations in Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
13. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) (holding that tracking an
automobile’s whereabouts using a physically mounted GPS tracker was a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
16. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
17. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986).
18. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (applying the Fourth Amendment’s trespass-based analytical
framework in determining whether a search has occurred).
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occurs unless a homeowner has explicitly or implicitly sanctioned the
government’s physical intrusion into the constitutionally protected area.19
At English common law, a person needed the homeowner’s express
permission to enter a neighbor’s property.20 The more modern rule
emanating from the Fourth Amendment, however, provides a license to
enter another’s property which “may be implied from the habits of the
country.”21 An implicit license in the United States typically permits a
visitor “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait
briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” 22
This implicit license to approach the front door extends to law enforcement
officers, because courts consider an encounter with law enforcement to be
no different than an encounter among private citizens.23 Moreover, “when
the police come on to private property to conduct an investigation or for
some other legitimate purpose and restrict their movements to places
visitors could be expected to go (e.g., walkways, driveways, porches),
observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth
Amendment.”24 Regardless of whether the person knocking is a private
citizen or a police officer, however, the homeowner has no obligation to
open the door or speak to the person knocking.25
Recently, in Florida v. Jardines, the primary case on which the Carloss
court relied, the Supreme Court recognized the constitutional validity of
knock and talks.26 There, two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents conducted a knock and talk after the Miami-Dade Police Department
received a tip that someone was growing marijuana in Joelis Jardines’s

19. See id. Of course, there are other circumstances where warrantless searches may be
permitted, like the emergency aid or exigent circumstances exceptions.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id. (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)).
22. Id.
23. See id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)); United States v.
Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (“As commonly understood, a ‘knock
and talk’ is a consensual encounter and therefore does not contravene the Fourth
Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion.”); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497,
519 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Officers are allowed to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise
approach the residence seeking to speak to the inhabitants just as any private citizen may.”).
24. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 2.3(f) (5th ed. 2016)) (footnotes omitted).
25. See King, 563 U.S. at 469–70 (“[W]hether the person who knocks on the door and
requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no
obligation to open the door or to speak.”).
26. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
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home.27 The officers approached Jardines’s home with a drug-sniffing dog,
which alerted the agents to the presence of contraband.28 Based on the alert,
the officers obtained a search warrant and subsequently found marijuana
plants.29 Jardines was arrested and charged with trafficking.30
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer whether the use of the
drug-sniffing dog on Jardines’s porch constituted a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.31 Asserting that the officers’ conduct
was constitutional under the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test and
relying on two similar cases, United States v. Place32 and Illinois v.
Caballes,33 the State of Florida argued that the use of a drug-sniffing dog
did not implicate any legitimate privacy interests.34 In rejecting this
argument, the Court limited its analysis solely to Jones’s trespass theory,
asserting that “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by physically
intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a “search” within the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”35
Maintaining there was “no doubt” that the officers entered the home’s
curtilage, resulting in an investigation within a constitutionally protected
area, the Court asserted that the next question was “whether it was
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.”36
At oral argument, Florida contended Jardines had conceded in the lower
courts that the officers had a right to be on his front porch.37 The Supreme
Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that
using a drug dog was a “search” because the officers obtained information
in a constitutionally protected area without the homeowner’s explicit or
implicit consent.38 Justice Scalia characterized Jardines’ alleged concession
that the State had a right to be on his front porch as “misstat[ing] the
record” and emphasized that Jardines had “conceded nothing more than the
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5.
32. 462 U.S. 696, 698 (1983) (holding that a canine inspection of luggage in an airport
did not violate the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test).
33. 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (holding that a canine inspection of an automobile during
a lawful traffic stop did not violate the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test).
34. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10.
35. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)).
36. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 7 n.1.
38. Id. at 11-12.
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unsurprising proposition that the officers could have lawfully approached
his home to knock on the front door in hopes of speaking with him.” 39 “Of
course,” Justice Scalia wrote, “that is not what they did.”40 Instead, the
officers introduced “a trained police dog to explore the area around the
home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”41 According to
Justice Scalia, “[t]here is no customary invitation to do that.”42
An implied license to enter another’s property to knock on his or her
door is not without limitation. Homeowners can prevent ordinary citizens
and police officers alike from conducting a knock and talk by revoking the
implied license. However, revocations are rare. Few citizens know that this
implied license exists, and fewer still know what must be done to revoke it.
Because the license arises from social custom and a “special form of
consent by silence,” the homeowner bears the burden to demonstratively
opt out of the habits of the country.43 Generally, albeit not uniformly, courts
hold that a homeowner may revoke the implied license by “clear
demonstrations”44 or “express orders,”45 which are “obvious to the casual
visitor”46 and “unambiguous.”47 As was the case in Carloss, “No
Trespassing” signs are routine sources of litigation, as courts must attempt
to determine whether the signs have revoked the implied license.48

39. Id. at 7 n.1.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id.
43. 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 106 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that implied
licenses are limited by a homeowner’s ability, “at low cost, to express . . . dissent from the
custom” by posting a sign forbidding entrance to the property).
44. E.g., State v. Grice, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (N.C. 2015) (noting that implied licenses
“may be limited or rescinded by clear demonstrations by the homeowners and is already
limited by our social customs”) (emphasis added).
45. E.g., Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964) (noting that there is
no rule against approaching a home to speak with the occupants “[a]bsent express orders”)
(emphasis added).
46. E.g., State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at
*8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2015), aff’d, State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn.
2017) (noting that “revocation must be obvious to the casual visitor who wishes only to
contact the residents of a property”) (emphasis added).
47. E.g., State v. Howard, 315 P.3d 854, 860 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (emphasizing the
homeowner did not revoke the implied license because the message to the public was not
“unambiguous”).
48. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 2016).
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II. United States v. Carloss
A. Facts
In Carloss, the United States prosecuted Ralph Carloss for drug and
weapons offenses based on evidence obtained by two police officers as the
result of a knock and talk.49 A federal agent received tips that Carloss, a
convicted felon, was selling methamphetamine and was in possession of a
firearm.50 To investigate, the federal agent and a local police investigator
went to the home in which Carloss was staying to talk with him.51 Although
there was not a fence or any other enclosure around the house or yard, there
were four “No Trespassing” signs on the property—three in the yard and
one on the front door.52 Despite the presence of these signs, the officers
parked in the driveway, walked to the door, and knocked “for several
minutes.”53 Although the officers heard movement inside, no one answered
the door.54 A “short time later,” a woman emerged from the back door and
met the two officers in the side yard.55 While the officers were explaining
why they were there, Carloss exited the house and joined the woman and
the officers in the side yard.56 After inquiring about who owned the home,
the officers asked Carloss if they could search the house.57 Carloss
responded that he would have to go inside to get “the man of the house,”

49. Id. at 990–91.
50. Id. at 990.
51. Id.
52. Id. All of the signs were professionally printed with either yellow or orange words
on a black background. Id. One “No Trespassing” sign was placed on a three-foot-high
wooden post adjacent to the driveway on the side farthest from the house. Id. There was
another sign tacked to a tree in the side yard. Id. Both of these signs contained the words
“Private Property No Trespassing.” Id. Additionally, there was a sign on a wooden pole in
the front yard next to the driveway closest to the house, and a sign on the front door of the
house. Id. Both of these signs contained the words “Posted Private Property Hunting,
Fishing, Trapping or Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators Will Be
Prosecuted.” Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 990–91.
56. Id. at 991. The court noted that neither the woman nor Carloss pointed out the “No
Trespassing” signs to the officers, nor did they ask the officers to leave the premises. Id.
57. Id.
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Earnest Dry.58 When the officers asked if they could accompany Carloss
inside the home, he allegedly replied, “Sure.”59
Carloss and the officers entered the house and went into Carloss’s room,
where the officers noticed drug paraphernalia and a white powder that
appeared to be methamphetamine.60 When Mr. Dry entered the room, the
officers requested his permission to search the house.61 After calling his
attorney, Dry asked the officers to leave, and they complied with the
request.62 Relying on their observations of the drug paraphernalia and white
powder, the officers obtained a search warrant, which led to the discovery
of multiple methamphetamine labs, additional drug paraphernalia, and a
loaded shotgun.63 Based on this evidence, Carloss and Dry were
prosecuted.64 After the district court denied Carloss’s motion to suppress
the evidence found in the house, Carloss conditionally pled guilty to
conspiring to possess pseudoephedrine pending appeal of the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.65 Carloss was sentenced to forty-nine
months in prison.66
B. Issue
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Carloss contended that the search of his
home was illegal because the underlying warrant was based on information
the officers obtained while violating the Fourth Amendment.67 According to
Carloss, the violation occurred when the officers entered the curtilage of his
home to conduct the knock and talk because the four “No Trespassing”
signs had revoked the officers’ implied license to approach his home and
knock on the door.68 Additionally, Carloss argued that the officers exceeded
the scope of their implied license by knocking at his door too long69 and
that his consent to the search was involuntary.70 Thus, the Tenth Circuit was
58. Id. Although Dry was identified as the owner, Dry’s mother was the actual owner.
Id.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 997–98.
Id. at 998.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/5

2018]

NOTES

501

faced with three issues: (1) whether the “No Trespassing” signs revoked the
implied license required to conduct the knock and talk; (2) if the implied
license had not been revoked, whether the officers exceeded the scope of
the license; and (3) whether Carloss’s consent to the search was
involuntary.71
C. Majority Decision
In considering whether the four “No Trespassing” signs revoked the
officers’ implied license, the Tenth Circuit confined its analysis to Jones’s
resurrected trespass theory.72 After expounding Tenth Circuit knock-andtalk jurisprudence, the court turned its focus to Florida v. Jardines,73
emphasizing that the case did not alter prior law upholding knock and
talks.74 Basing its reasoning on the Jardines Court’s validation of knock
and talks, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Carloss’s “No Trespassing”
signs did not revoke the officers’ implied license.75 In doing so, the court
emphasized that a knock and talk is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.76
The court then distinguished the case at bar from Jardines, asserting that
Jardines did not actually involve a knock and talk because the “officers
approached the front door of a home, not seeking a consensual knock-andtalk, but instead specifically to conduct a search from the porch.”77 Unlike
Jardines, there was “nothing in this record to suggest that the officers
conducted, or intended to conduct, a search from the front porch when they
went onto the front porch to knock on Carloss’s front door.”78 Moreover,
unlike Jardines, the officers did not “discover any incriminating evidence
while they were on the front porch knocking.”79

71. See id. at 997–98.
72. Id. at 992 n.2 (“Carloss expressly bases his argument solely on the trespass theory of
Fourth Amendment protections and we, therefore, confine our analysis to that theory.”).
73. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013)
74. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 992.
75. Id. at 995.
76. Id. at 993 (quoting Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9 n.4) (“Jardines reiterated that a knockand-talk itself is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes: ‘[I]t is not a Fourth
Amendment search to approach the home in order to speak with the occupant, because all
are invited to do that. The mere purpose of discovering information in the course of
engaging in that permitted conduct does not cause it to violate the Fourth Amendment.’”).
77. Id. at 992–93.
78. Id. at 993.
79. Id.
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But the Tenth Circuit arrived at this conclusion only by finding that the
implied license to access Carloss’s curtilage and approach his home had not
been revoked.80 In rejecting Carloss’s claim that the implied license had
been revoked, the majority adopted a case-by-case rule (the “Revocation
Rule”) under which revocation “depends on the context in which a member
of the public, or an officer seeking to conduct a knock-and-talk,
encountered the signs and the message that those signs would have
conveyed to an objective officer, or member of the public, under the
circumstances.”81 Applying the Revocation Rule, the court focused on the
physical placement of each of Carloss’s signs. The court held that the three
signs in the yard and along the driveway would not have conveyed to an
objective officer that the license had been revoked, because they were
located in “open fields,” which are not constitutionally protected areas.82
Additionally, the court held that the sign on the front door was
“ambiguous” and therefore “did not clearly revoke the implied license.”83
Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the officers did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the “objective officer” would not have
understood that the implied license to conduct a knock and talk had been
revoked.84
D. Concurrence
Although Chief Judge Timothy Tymkovich concurred with the majority,
his analysis differed: “A Fourth Amendment physical-intrusion case poses a
twofold question: (1) whether police intruded without license into a
80. Id. at 997. Without finding the existence of an implied license and Carloss’s lack of
revocation, a search would have “undoubtedly occurred,” because the officers would have
been physically intruding into a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain
information.
81. Id. at 994.
82. Id. at 995. Additionally, the court noted that it was Carloss’s burden to establish
what was included in the home’s curtilage, and that Carloss did not expressly claim that
these areas were part of the home’s curtilage. Id.
83. Id. at 996.
84. Id. at 997. The Tenth Circuit also addressed Carloss’s arguments that the officers
exceeded the scope of their implied license by knocking at the door too long and that his
consent was the product of the Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 997–98. In response to
his contention that the officers exceeded the scope of the implied license, the court declined
“to place a specific time limit on how long a person can knock before exceeding the scope of
this implied license.” Id. at 998. In response to Carloss’s contention that his consent was
based off of a Fourth Amendment violation, the court held that the “district court’s finding
that Carloss voluntarily consented to the officers accompanying him into the house was not
clearly erroneous,” because “there was no such Fourth Amendment violation.” Id. at 998–99.
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constitutionally protected area, and (2) whether they obtained information
via that intrusion.”85 Because the homeowner bears the burden of revoking
the license by showing that he has opted out of the country’s habits, Judge
Tymkovich contended that the majority should have applied a different test:
[T]he court must deploy an objective test, asking whether a
reasonable person would conclude that entry onto the curtilage—
the front porch here—by police or others was categorically
barred. In other words, we look to each case’s facts to determine
whether the reasonable person would think the license had been
revoked. And the question presented by this case is whether “No
Trespassing” signs in the circumstances here communicates a
categorical bar that is clear that no one would step on the front
porch. In my view, this is a question of context: the time, place,
manner, and circumstance of the encounter.86
Considering the context, Chief Judge Tymkovich agreed with the majority
that Carloss failed to show that the implied license had been revoked, but
emphasized that, in “a residential context, the intention of the homeowner
who posts signs, without more, seems inadequate to revoke the license.”87
Noting that it was not his view “that a ‘No Trespassing’ sign will never
indicate the revocation of the implied license,”88 Chief Judge Tymkovich
offered examples of additional measures that would be sufficient to do so,
suggesting that a “closed or locked gate,” a “fence,” or some “other
physical obstacle,” in the “residential context” would likely be sufficient.89
Here, because no additional measures clarified that the license had been
revoked, the first prong was not satisfied, and therefore no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred.90
E. Dissent
Judge Neil Gorsuch, now an Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, dissented. Judge Gorsuch noted that the government
asserted two theories advocating that the officers’ conduct was
constitutional, and that, despite the majority and concurrence rejecting both
theories, the court chose to instead produce its own theories to resolve the
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 1001 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 999–1000.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

504

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:493

case.91 The first argument advanced by the government and subsequently
dismissed by the court was that police officers have “an irrevocable right to
enter a home’s curtilage to conduct a knock and talk” because a knock and
talk is “an investigative technique approved by the Supreme Court.”92 Judge
Gorsuch noted that under this theory, a homeowner “may post as many No
Trespassing signs as she wishes. She might add a wall or a medieval-style
moat, too. Maybe razor wire and battlements and mantraps besides. Even
that isn’t enough to revoke the state’s right to enter.”93 Judge Gorsuch
dismissed this argument, saying, “[n]ot one of the members of this court
accepts it. In fact, neither of my colleagues’ opinions even dignifies it with
discussion.”94
Next, Judge Gorsuch examined the government’s second argument, that
“a homeowner may avoid a knock and talk only by hiding in the home and
refusing to answer the door,” or “maybe, as the government seemed to
concede at oral argument, by opening the door and commanding officers to
leave.”95 Noting that this argument was “no more persuasive than the last,”
Judge Gorsuch asserted it was actually “no different from the last.”96
Rejecting the government’s second argument, Judge Gorsuch asserted that a
“homeowner who refuses to answer the door, or who opens it to say ‘go
away,’ does so after the officers have already entered the home’s front
porch and knocked on the door—everything the implied license permits the
officers to do.”97
Judge Gorsuch then criticized the concurring opinion, arguing that it is
“a pretty rare day when we pursue an argument for a party that the party has
so avidly disowned.”98 Additionally, he continued, the cases the
concurrence cited were inapplicable because they applied only to “open
fields.”99 Moreover, Judge Gorsuch argued that the concurrence offered no

91. Id. at 1004 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1007.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1009 (asserting that not only did the government fail to present an argument
similar to the concurrence’s theory, it expressly disavowed that theory by “telling us
repeatedly that walls and fences (yes, even moats) cannot keep its agents from entering the
curtilage to conduct a knock and talk”).
99. Id.
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valid authority, resting “predominantly on certain intuitions about what
‘reasonable people’ think.”100
Turning his focus next to the majority opinion, Judge Gorsuch criticized
the court’s decision to analyze the signs separately, which, in his opinion,
led the court to reach the wrong conclusion.101 The majority regarded the
three signs in the yard incorrectly; it was in conflict with the authorities it
relied on, yet “discusses none of them.”102 Moreover, “the only cases it does
cite stand simply for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment is
inapplicable to open fields.”103
According to Judge Gorsuch, the majority also incorrectly interpreted the
sign on the front door. This argument is primarily based on the conflict
inherent in the court’s conclusion that the sign was “ambiguous” even
though the sign’s express language forbid “TRESPASSING FOR ANY
PURPOSE”—a notion that was “especially” true when considering that
there was “no evidence in the record that any hunting, fishing, or trapping
took place in the yard of this home in the middle of town along a paved
street.”104 Calling the outcome a “paradox,” Judge Gorsuch summarized the
majority opinion, saying it stood for the proposition that “No Trespassing”
signs revoke the license only when “they (1) are placed visibly on the
curtilage itself and (2) don’t contain surplus language about hunting and
trapping.”105
III. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Carloss is problematic
for two reasons. First, the court’s formulation of the Revocation Rule rests
on weak authority, fails to consider the relevance of common law and
statutory trespass into the curtilage of a home, and ignores considerable
authority supporting a “No Trespassing” sign’s ability to revoke an implied
license. Moreover, the holding may lead to a series of dangerous and
unfavorable results.
Second, the Tenth Circuit improperly applied the Rule because it failed
to properly consider the totality of the circumstances. The court erroneously
dismissed the three signs in the yard based on their legal inability to prevent

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1012–13.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id. at 1013–14.
Id. at 1014.
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trespass into “open fields,” despite the officers’ entry into the home’s
curtilage, and then proceeded to dismiss the sign on the front door by
determining that it was “ambiguous,” despite its express language
prohibiting trespass “for any purpose.”
A. Formulation of the Revocation Rule
The Revocation Rule hangs its hat on weak authority, relying on two
cases that have distinguishable facts and involve separate and distinct issues
from Carloss. Both cases, State v. Christensen,106 an unpublished
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals decision from 2015, and State v.
Hiebert,107 an Idaho Supreme Court case from 2014, came from outside the
court’s jurisdiction and are merely persuasive. The Carloss court’s reliance
on these cases is troubling for several reasons.
For one, the court’s reliance on these cases is puzzling because neither
Christensen nor Hiebert seem to persuade other jurisdictions. The Tenth
Circuit is only one of three courts to cite to Christensen and one of three
courts to cite to Hiebert. Moreover, in its search for authority, the Tenth
Circuit limited its examination of case law to post-Jardines cases despite its
explicit assertion that “Jardines did not change our prior law upholding
knock-and-talks.”108 Nevertheless, the court said, “Carloss has not cited, nor
can we find, any post-Jardines authority holding that a resident can revoke
the implied license to approach his home and knock on the front door
simply by posting a ‘No Trespassing’ sign.”109 It seems contradictory to say
on one hand that Jardines did not change prior law while on the other
rejecting any pre-Jardines authority on “No Trespassing” signs and knock
and talks.
Further, both Christensen and Hiebert involve questions that are separate
and distinct from those in Carloss. Unlike the court in Carloss, the courts in
both cases limited their Fourth Amendment analysis to the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test, which is independent of Jones’s trespass-based
test.110 The Carloss court relies on Christensen’s assertion that the
“emerging rule appears to be that the implied invitation of the front door
106. No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May
14, 2015), aff’d, 517 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. 2017).
107. 329 P.3d 1085, 1090 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).
108. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 992.
109. Id. at 995.
110. See id. at 992 n.2 (“Carloss expressly bases his argument solely on the trespass
theory of Fourth Amendment protections and we, therefore, confine our analysis to that
theory.”).
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can be revoked but that the revocation must be obvious to the casual visitor
who wishes only to contact the residents of a property.”111 But this assertion
immediately follows an extensive consideration of case law supporting the
proposition that the “vast majority” of cases consider “No Trespassing”
signs when determining “whether a person has demonstrated a legitimate
expectation of privacy.”112 Notably, and unlike the Tenth Circuit, the
Christensen court omitted any substantial consideration of Jones or its
trespass theory.113 In Hiebert, the court specifically addressed the
defendant’s argument that officers had “violated his reasonable expectation
of privacy by entering into the junk yard portion of his property.”114 The
Hiebert court also omitted any substantial consideration of Jones or the
trespass theory, instead asserting that “there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to observations made” during use of an implied
license.115
Hiebert and Christensen are also factually distinguishable from Carloss.
For example, unlike Carloss, the defendant in Hiebert did not contest the
police’s entry into his home or curtilage. Rather, Hiebert involved officers
entering a junkyard which, in addition to being a residence, was open to the
public for business purposes.116 As the court noted, “the expectation of what
an ordinary visitor (in many cases, a customer of the business) might
reasonably do is expanded,” creating “an implied—if not explicit—
invitation” to enter the junkyard.117 Moreover, the single “No Trespassing”
sign was not easily visible due to its “obscure placement” on a shed outside
the curtilage, and the officers entered the property during business hours
through a gate bearing an “open” sign on it.118 Whatever message “No
Trespassing” signs communicated under these circumstances is

111. Id. at 994–95 (citing Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8).
112. Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *7. The court cites thirteen cases, each of which
considers “No Trespassing” signs in light of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. See
id.
113. The court does not cite Jones; admittedly, though, it refers to “the Jardines search
test.” See id. at *5, *8 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7–12 (2013)). But this
reference was briefly discussed and subsequently dismissed after the court improperly
characterized it as a test that “focuses more on trespass law than on expectation of privacy,”
instead of recognizing it as a separate and distinct test. See id.
114. State v. Hiebert, 329 P.3d 1085, 1088 (Idaho Ct. App. 2014).
115. Id. at 1091.
116. Id. at 1089.
117. Id. at 1089–90 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 1087-88, 1090–91, 1091 n.4.
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substantially different than the message communicated in the present case,
especially when applying a different Fourth Amendment privacy test.
In addition to these problems, the Tenth Circuit also erroneously denied
the relevance of common law and statutory trespass to entry into the
curtilage, instead limiting its focus to entry into open fields. According to
the court, the signs leading up to Carloss’s home would not have conveyed
to an objective officer or member of the public that he or she could not
conduct a knock and talk, because “No Trespassing” signs “will not prevent
an officer from entering privately owned ‘open fields.’”119 The court noted
that police may enter open fields even if the entry would be a trespass at
common law, because “in the case of open fields, the general rights of
property protected by the common law of trespass have little or no
relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.”120 The court also
noted that police may enter open fields even if the entry might have
violated Oklahoma statutory law, citing a case holding that “officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they made observations from a
defendant’s open field, even though the officers, in entering the open field,
violated Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1835.”121
Although the court was correct in its assertion that common law and
statutory trespass do not prevent officers from entering open fields, it
incorrectly extended this premise to the curtilage. Trespass has “little or no
relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment”—but only “in the
case of open fields.”122 Contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s holding, both
common law and statutory trespass are relevant when officers enter the
curtilage, because unlike an open field, which is not a constitutionally
protected area, the front porch is afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection.123
The court also ignored a considerable amount of authority supporting a
“No Trespassing” sign’s ability to revoke an implied license. While the
Fourth Amendment does not “incorporate” state statutes,124 a great deal of
authority suggests that the common law at the time of the founding did not
119. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 995.
120. Id. at 996 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84).
121. Id. (citing United States v. Hatfield, 333 F.3d 1189, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2003)).
122. See id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
123. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 7 (2013) (noting that the front porch of a home
is “the classic exemplar” of curtilage).
124. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 169 (2008) (“No early case or commentary, to
our knowledge, suggested the Amendment was intended to incorporate subsequently enacted
statutes.”).
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require a homeowner to revoke a license in any particular way. Rather,
“express words . . . [or] an act . . . indicating an intention to revoke” were
sufficient.125 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that a
homeowner may prevent visitors from entering his or her property to knock
at the front door “by notice or order.”126 In determining what kind of
“notice” is sufficient for revocation of the license, the Breard Court cited
“trespass after warning” statutes, seemingly recognizing a “No
Trespassing” sign’s ability to prevent unwanted guests from approaching
the home.127 Additionally, most state legislatures have enacted laws
providing that entry after notice—specifically “No Trespassing” signs—
will support criminal trespass actions.128 It is counterintuitive that police
officers are permitted to conduct a knock and talk because “they do no
more than any private citizen might do,”129 yet a private citizen can be held
criminally liable for the same action. This notion holds especially true when
considering that a single “No Trespassing” sign does the trick when used by
the government.130
The court’s Rule also leads to a series of dangerous and unfavorable
results. First, the practical effect of the Tenth Circuit’s complicated contextbased rule is the creation of a de facto permanent easement for police
officers to approach the front door of a home to “consensually” talk with
the homeowner—because most homeowners do not know an implied
license exists, and fewer know how to revoke it.
The potential for a de facto permanent easement is illustrated by the
arguments advanced by the government in Carloss. In its opening brief, the
government suggested that the police have an irrevocable right to enter a
125. 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 836 (Basil Jones, ed., 3d ed.
1939).
126. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951) (emphasis added). Notably,
Jardines relies on Breard. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (citing Breard, 341 U.S. at 626).
127. See Breard, 341 U.S. at 626 n.2 (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
147 n.10 (1943)).
128. See, e.g., 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1835 (2011) (endorsing the use of “NO
TRESPASSING” or “similar signs”); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §
21.2 (2d ed. 2003) (citing and collecting state statutes).
129. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).
130. See State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at
*12 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2015), aff’d, 517 S.W.3d 60 (Tenn. 2017) (Williams, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The federal [or state] government can put up a
single “No Trespassing” sign on a fence at a nuclear facility or an abandoned munitions
facility, and a trespass there upon is a trespass . . . . If governments can use a single sign so
effectively against citizens, why then can not citizens use a sign equally against
governments?”).
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home’s curtilage to conduct a knock and talk.131 The government asserted
an additional theory, arguing that even if a license existed, a homeowner
may only avoid a knock and talk by refusing to open the door or by opening
the door and requesting that the officers leave.132 But as Judge Gorsuch
pointed out, a homeowner who refuses to open the door or asks the officers
to leave “does so after the officers have already entered the home’s front
porch and knocked on the door—everything the implied license permits the
officers to do.”133 The government’s argument implies the existence of a de
facto permanent easement because, following the government’s logic, a
homeowner cannot revoke the license. Rather, the homeowner may merely
limit it by refusing to answer the door or telling the officers to go away—
but only after the officers have used the license to enter the curtilage.
Second, the Revocation Rule also creates an unworkable precedent for
both police officers and homeowners. The Rule requires a court to make
fact-specific, case-by-case determinations, leading to the inability of both
police and citizens to know before an encounter whether an implied license
has been revoked. This area necessitates clear rules for police to follow in
order to determine whether their actions will violate the Constitution.134
Under the court’s case-by-case approach, police must conjecture as to the
legal conclusion that a reviewing court may make before conducting a
knock and talk. Specifically, police must decide whether a homeowner has
taken sufficient measures to revoke the license—determinations that remain
uncertain and inconsistent in courts across America—such as whether the
homeowner erected a high enough fence or posted a sufficient number of
“No Trespassing” signs.135 As the Supreme Court has said, whether the

131. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12–15, United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988
(10th Cir. 2016) (No. 13-7082) (failing to address any available method of revocation and
applying the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test).
132. Id. at 17-18; see Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1007 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (noting that the
government “seemed to concede at oral argument” that a homeowner may be able to avoid a
knock and talk by opening the door and requesting that the officers leave).
133. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1007 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
134. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Often enough, the
Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the
object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear
and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months
and years after an arrest or search is made.”).
135. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (citing New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 458 (1981)). The Oliver Court asserted that case-by-case approaches to determine
Fourth Amendment violations are unfavorable, because “police officers would have to guess
before every search whether landowners had erected fences sufficiently high, posted a
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officer’s actions would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment “would
turn on ‘[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs,
ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
distinctions.’”136 Thus, the Rule creates an unworkable precedent for police
officers, because it makes it difficult for officers to discern the scope of
their authority, creating “a danger that constitutional rights will be
arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.”137
Similarly, homeowners deserve to know whether the measures they have
taken sufficiently revoke the implied license.138 The Rule’s case-by-case
approach provides little of the direction or notice homeowners need in order
to know whether the implied license has been revoked. If four standard,
store-bought “No Trespassing” signs139 are insufficient to revoke the
implied license, what must a homeowner do to actually revoke the license?
Judge Gorsuch snidely suggests the following sign:
THE IMPLIED LICENSE DISCUSSED BY THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT IN BREARD v. ALEXANDRIA,
341 U.S. 622 (1951) AND FLORIDA v. JARDINES, 133 S. Ct.
1409, 185 L.Ed.2d 495 (2013) IS HEREBY REVOKED.140
Although this sign would (hopefully) suffice, the establishment of such a
high standard remains problematic. The average citizen—and arguably
even the average law professor who does not specialize in the Fourth
Amendment—does not have the knowledge necessary to meet this standard
and revoke the license. This high standard led Judge Gorsuch to wonder
whether the Rule would “do no more than invite a new cottage industry,
one spitting out lawn signs with long and lawyerly (and no doubt less
intuitive and commonsensical) messages instead of the tried and true ‘No
Trespassing.’”141
Unsurprisingly, the niche-industry Judge Gorsuch envisioned has come
to fruition. Two law professors now sell “LAWn Signs,” which mirror
sufficient number of warning signs, or located contraband in an area sufficiently secluded to
establish a right of privacy.” Id.
136. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 458).
137. See id. at 181–82 (citation omitted).
138. United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1269 (M.D. Fla. 2015).
139. Again, three signs were in the yard lining the driveway leading up to the house
where any visitor would see them, and one was in the middle of the front door, expressly
stating “Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden.” United States v. Carloss, 818
F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at 1012.
141. Id.
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Judge Gorsuch’s suggestion and explicitly revoke the implied license. 142
The professors behind the signs collaboratively authored a law review
article to raise awareness of the implied license and teach the average
citizen how to revoke it.143 The professor’s “LAWn Signs” serve as further
evidence that the Tenth Circuit’s Rule created an unworkable precedent for
homeowners who do not know whether the implied license has been
revoked.
Finally, the Revocation Rule threatens to further diminish the Fourth
Amendment protections afforded to the home and its curtilage. When
combined with other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement,144 the knock and talk becomes a compelling investigative tool
for police. The technique, however, has the potential to be abused, and
therefore has the potential to substantially limit Fourth Amendment
protections bestowed to the home. For example, because it requires no level
of suspicion whatsoever, the knock and talk provides a mechanism for
police to circumvent arrest and search warrant requirements.145 Most often,
police use knock and talks when they suspect criminal activity within a
home but lack probable cause or reasonable suspicion.146 As the former
Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court said, “[A] knock and talk is
used to obtain consent by none too subtle intimidation, which further
illustrates that it is not simply being used to ask questions at the door as
anyone might do.”147 And, as Judge Gorsuch noted, the potential for abuse
is large when no level of suspicion is required: “Because everything
happens with the homeowner’s consent, the theory goes, a warrant isn’t
142. See FOURTH AMENDMENT SECURITY, https://fourthamendmentsecurity.com/ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2017). In addition to yard signs, the website sells other merchandise
attempting to protect Fourth Amendment rights, including bumper stickers, luggage tags,
and t-shirts. Id.
143. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Stephen E. Henderson, Lawn Signs: A Fourth
Amendment for Constitutional Curmudgeons, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 494 (2016).
144. For example, exigent circumstances, consent, the “plain view” doctrine, and
searches incident to arrest.
145. See Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J.
1099, 1104 (2009) (“Police use ‘knock and talk[s]’ to gain access to a home without a search
warrant by getting the occupant to consent to entry and search, to arrest without a warrant, to
gather further evidence of a suspected crime, or to dispel such suspicion.”).
146. See id. (noting that a knock and talk is “a technique employed with calculation to
the homes of people suspected of crimes”).
147. Jim Hannah, Forgotten Law and Judicial Duty, 70 ALB. L. REV. 829, 837 (2007);
see Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011) (justifying knock and talks because “[w]hen
law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no
more than any private citizen might do”).
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needed. . . . But in the constant competition between constable and quarry,
officers sometimes use knock and talks in ways that test the boundaries of
the consent on which they depend.”148 Thus, knock and talks carry great
potential to erode Fourth Amendment protections of the home, because
homeowners do not know how to revoke the license and because the police
continue to test the boundaries of consent—often without limitation.
B. Application of the Revocation Rule
In its application of the Revocation Rule, the Tenth Circuit failed to
sufficiently consider the totality of the circumstances. Rejecting both the
government’s and Carloss’s arguments, the court advanced its own legal
theory—a theory “the district court never passed upon and the government
never presented.”149 In doing so, the court ignored the fact that all of the
elements necessary to establish a “search” were present. It was undisputed,
and the government conceded, that the officers physically entered the
home’s curtilage when they stepped on Carloss’s front porch, that the
officers entered the curtilage to obtain information, and that the officers
acted without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or the homeowner’s
express consent.150 Thus, the entirety of the case turned on the existence of
the implied license, which in turn depended on whether Carloss sufficiently
revoked his implicit consent. Without the license, the government’s
physical intrusion would have amounted to a “search” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.151 Analyzing the three signs in the yard
separately from the sign on the front door, the court failed to sufficiently
consider the totality of the circumstances, concluding that the signs would
not have conveyed to an objective officer that the license had been
revoked.152 To the contrary, a proper consideration of the totality of the
circumstances is more consistent with revocation.
In applying its context-based Rule, the majority conveniently
compartmentalized the signs for the purpose of its analysis. The court
148. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1003 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
149. Id. at 1013 (arguing that the majority’s theory is not “so obviously correct” that “we
might confidently dispense with the adversarial process and adopt it without bothering to
hear from the parties or district court”).
150. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 131, at *17.
151. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“The Government
physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no
doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
152. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 2016).
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considered the three signs aligning Carloss’s driveway separately from the
sign placed on Carloss’s front door. The majority erroneously dismissed the
first three “No Trespassing” signs, asserting the signs “would not have
conveyed to an objective officer, or member of the public,” that the license
had been revoked.153 The court’s dismissal of these signs was improper,
because it based its reasoning on the signs’ location—outside the
curtilage—maintaining that “No Trespassing” signs “will not prevent an
officer from entering privately owned ‘open fields.’”154 The cases the
majority cites to support this proposition, Rieck v. Jensen155 and Oliver v.
United States,156 hold that the Fourth Amendment’s protections do not
extend to open fields, but they have no bearing on intrusions into the
curtilage. Indeed, the cases do not address whether “No Trespassing”
signs—although placed in open fields—can adequately communicate to an
objective officer or member of the public that entry into the curtilage is
prohibited.157
Next, the majority addressed the sign on the front door of the house.158
Again, the court found this “No Trespassing” sign insufficient to revoke the
implied license, reasoning that the sign was “ambiguous” because it
prohibited activities that ordinarily do not take place within the curtilage.159
Asserting that the sign “could have simply been reiterating that such
recreational activities would not be allowed on the property generally,”160
the court maintained that the message did not “clearly and unambiguously
tell the mail carrier, pizza deliverer, or police officer that they cannot knock
on the front door seeking a consensual conversation with those who live
there.”161
153. Id. at 995.
154. Id. (citations omitted).
155. 651 F.3d 1188, 1189, 1191–94 (10th Cir. 2011).
156. 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984).
157. In Rieck, the Tenth Circuit held that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred
when a deputy sheriff entered private property by opening a closed gate with a “No
Trespassing” sign. 651 F.3d at 1189. But unlike the case at hand, the Rieck court was
confronted with an officer’s entry into an open field—not curtilage. Id. at 1192. Similarly,
Oliver was not concerned with a constitutionally protected area, but merely stands for the
proposition that it is “not generally true that fences or ‘No Trespassing’ signs effectively bar
the public from viewing open fields in rural areas.” 466 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
158. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 990. Specifically, the sign stated, “Posted Private Property
Hunting, Fishing, Trapping or Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators
Will Be Prosecuted.” Id.
159. Id. at 996.
160. Id. at 996–97.
161. Id. at 997.
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The majority’s determination that the sign was ambiguous is
unwarranted for two reasons. First, law enforcement officials are
distinguishable from mail carriers and pizza deliverers, because, unlike
police officers, most mail carriers and other delivery services do not need to
make use of an implied license. Instead, a homeowner expressly invites
them onto the property by ordering a package or a pizza. It would have
been more appropriate for the Tenth Circuit to characterize police officers
as the Ninth Circuit did in Davis v. United States, where the court
analogized police officers to pollsters or door-to-door salesmen.162 Unlike
mailmen or pizza deliverers, pollsters, salesmen, and police officers are
virtually never expressly invited guests.
Moreover, the court cited no authority supporting its notion that
revocation for one is revocation for all. A homeowner should have the
ability to revoke the implied license, prohibiting entry by all unless
expressly invited.163 Such a revocation would only affect certain persons—
those who need the implied license to enter the property—because a
mailman or pizza deliverer has no need for an implied license when a
homeowner has expressly invited them onto the property.
The second problem with the majority’s application is that the
determination that the sign was “ambiguous” directly conflicted with both
the express language of and the circumstances surrounding the sign. The
court maintained that the sign, on its face, did not appear to be directed at
people desiring to speak with the homeowner, because the sign “referenced
activities that ordinarily do not take place within a home or its curtilage—
hunting, fishing, and trapping.”164 But these activities do not ordinarily take

162. See 327 F.2d 301, 303 (9th Cir. 1964), overruled by United States v. Perea-Rey, 680
F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012). As one court put it, “Davis is the seminal case announcing the
rationale underlying the knock and talk doctrine.” United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d
1252, 1265 n.18 (M.D. Fla. 2015); see also Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)
(noting that the implied license justifies ingress to the home by “solicitors, hawkers[,] and
peddlers”). The same logic applies to the government’s characterization, which likened
police officers to “postal carriers, FedEx couriers, flower delivery persons, [and] the
paperboy.” See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 131, at *19.
163. See FOURTH AMENDMENT SECURITY, supra note 142 (offering a lawn sign revoking
the implied license for certain groups of people, but not others: “I hereby REVOKE ALL
IMPLIED LICENSES to enter or approach my home. Girl Scouts, Delivery, and Friends:
Welcome! For-Profit Solicitors: Stay Out! Law Enforcement: Stay Out!”).
164. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 996–97.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

516

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:493

place within the “middle” of town, either.165 Moreover, the court’s
conclusion is enigmatic in that it suggests that additional language
(regarding hunting fishing, and trapping) detracts from a sign’s principal
warning—“Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden.”166
A proper consideration of the totality of the circumstances should have
indicated revocation—especially considering the number of the signs,167 the
fact the door knocker was replaced with a sign, and the express language on
the sign within the curtilage. Moreover, the court failed to offer any
evidence of the habits of the country. The court maintained that, taken
together, all four signs “would not have conveyed to an objective officer
that he could not go to the front door and knock.”168 But despite its
assertion that the license to conduct a knock and talk is “implied from the
habits of the country,”169 the majority failed to offer any evidence
whatsoever supporting its conclusory assertions regarding what an objective
officer or member of the public would have understood. Nor did the
concurrence offer any evidence to support what Judge Gorsuch calls its
“intuition about social customs.”170 According to Judge Gorsuch, the
“opposite intuition seems no less and maybe a good deal more
defensible.”171
The opposite intuition is indeed more defensible, especially in light of
the Supreme Court’s use of the “knocker” as a justification for knock and
talks. “In accordance [with] the habits of the country, the Supreme Court
has recognized that ‘the knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation
or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors,
hawkers[,] and peddlers of all kinds.’”172 But in Carloss, not only was the
knocker absent, it was replaced with a sign prohibiting trespassing “for Any

165. Id. at 990. Notably, there was no evidence in the record that any hunting, fishing, or
trapping took place “in the yard of this home in the middle of town along a paved street.” Id.
at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 996–97.
167. Judge Gorsuch makes the argument that a large number of “No Trespassing” signs,
“collectively and strategically placed,” should have the same effect as other additional
measures, such as a fence. Id. at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 995.
169. Id. at 994.
170. Id. at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. United States v. Jones, No. 4:13CR00011-003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *6 (W.D. Va.
Aug. 30, 2013) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (citing Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)).
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Purpose.”173 Therefore, the totality of the circumstances warranted a
different conclusion. To enter the home’s front porch, a visitor would have
to disregard four separate, explicit warnings that his or her presence was
unequivocally unwelcome.
IV. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Carloss is problematic due to the court’s
formulation and application of the Revocation Rule. The Rule is based on
weak authority, relying on dissimilar cases that applied the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test rather than Jones’s trespass test. It also fails to
consider the relevance of common law and statutory trespass into the
curtilage, and it ignores a considerable amount of authority supporting a
“No Trespassing” sign’s ability to revoke an implied license. Finally, the
Rule essentially creates a de facto permanent easement and sets an
unworkable precedent for both police officers and homeowners.
In addition to these problems with the formulation of the Rule, the Tenth
Circuit improperly applied it by failing to consider the totality of the
circumstances. The court dismissed the signs in the yard by mistakenly
relying on case law supporting the general rule that “No Trespassing” signs
do not prevent trespass into open fields. The court dismissed the sign on the
front door by finding it “ambiguous,” despite its express language
prohibiting trespass “for any purpose.” Contrary to the court’s holding, a
proper consideration of the totality of the circumstances in Carloss
indicates revocation of the implied license. In neglecting to appropriately
formulate or apply the Revocation Rule, the Tenth Circuit set a dangerous
precedent—escalating the dangers of knock and talks and eroding the
Fourth Amendment privacy protections afforded to the home and its
curtilage.
Skyler K. Sikes

173. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 990 (emphasis added).
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